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Abstract
Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical
aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggrega-
tion rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judg-
ments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and List
and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, two problems that we distinguish emphat-
ically here. The current theory has developed from the discursive dilemma,
rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the final objective of the paper is
to give the latter its own theoretical development along the line of recent
work by Dietrich and Mongin. However, the paper also aims at reviewing
logical aggregation theory as such, and it covers impossibility theorems by
Dietrich, Dietrich and List, Dokow and Holzman, List and Pettit, Mon-
gin, Nehring and Puppe, Pauly and van Hees, providing a uniform logical
framework in which they can be compared with each other. The review goes
through three historical stages: the initial paradox and dilemma, the scat-
tered early results on the independence axiom, and the so-called canonical
theorem, a collective achievement that provided the theory with its specific
method of analysis. The paper goes some way towards philosophical logic,
first by briefly connecting the aggregative framework of judgment with the
modern philosophy of judgment, and second by thoroughly discussing and
axiomatizing the "general logic" built in this framework.
JEL Reference Numbers: D 70, D 71, D 79.
Keywords: Judgment Aggregation, Logical Aggregation, Doctrinal Para-
dox, Discursive Dilemma, General Logic, Premiss-Based vs Conclusion-Based
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Contemporary aggregation theories have their roots in mathematical analy-
ses of voting, developed in France from the end of the 18th century, as well
as in the technical formulations of utilitarianism and its rarified variant, wel-
fare economics, which were to follow in Great Britain from the 18th century
to the middle of the 20th century. Classical and then neo-classical econo-
mists set great store by this second source, but were entirely unaware of
the first, until Arrow masterfully orchestrated their reconciliation in Social
Choice and Individual Values (1951). The title of his work fixed the accepted
name of the theory it propounds, of social choice, a rather inaccurate name,
because social choice theory starts with preference and not choice, as its
fundamental concept, and it bears on all types of collectivity, the whole
of society being just one particular instance. With the no less improperly
named "social welfare" function, which is defined from individual to collec-
tive preferences, the Arrovian theory develops a formalism that can cover
all of the aggregation problems that the two historical traditions, the French
and the British, oﬀered in isolation. Indeed, the notion of preference, indi-
vidual or collective, can tend either towards the side of the utility function,
which "represents" preferences according to economists’ contemporary con-
ception, or towards the side of choice, which "reveals" preferences according
to the same conception. Voting is merely a particular kind of choice; it is in
this way that Arrow and his successors were able to connect Bentham with
Condorcet.
Considerable as that step of generalization might have been, it was still
not enough, since the preferences of individuals or of the collectivity be-
tween two states of aﬀairs do not exhaust the judgments they could make
about those states, and it is just as legitimate to look at the aggregation
of other kinds of judgments. "Bob prefers a long monthly meeting to short
weekly meetings" can be paraphrased by saying that Bob judges one such
meeting to be preferable to the others, and this makes us notice that pref-
erence is a special case in several ways. It is a comparative judgment made
from the evaluative point of view that is specific to preferability. Concerning
the same states of aﬀairs, Bob can form other judgments, either absolute
or again comparative: a long monthly meeting is tiring; more tiring than
short weekly meetings; successful; more successful than short weekly meet-
ings; and so on. It is even inevitable that Bob will form judgments other
than of preference, since like any form of evaluative judgment, they require
factual judgments to have already been made. When several Bobs express
themselves concerning both of these levels of judgment, should the theory
of aggregation only consider the final one without examining the interme-
diary one? Such a restriction would appear counter-productive, yet it is
imposed in social choice theory, which does not admit judgments other than
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of preference.
A new theory, called judgment aggregation theory, overcomes this limita-
tion. Its formalism allows it to represent individual and collective judgments
of any kind, and thus to attack an entire class of neglected aggregation prob-
lems. The contributors to this theory add one step of generalization to that
made by Arrow and his disciples in their time. From this group, they retain
the axiomatic method of investigation. Indeed, they posit on individual and
collective judgments certain normative properties which parallel the con-
straints imposed on preferences, and define a collective judgment function,
going from admissible profiles of individual judgments to admissible collec-
tive judgments, which is the formal analogue of the social welfare function.
They study properties that collective judgment functions could satisfy in
terms of impossibility and possibility theorems, which is how Arrovian the-
ory proceeds with the social welfare function.
There are already so many and diverse such axiomatic studies that it is
impossible to account for them without fixing an angle of attack. The present
account underlines the logical side of individual and collective judgments
and sets out the new theory from this vantage point. Accordingly, we will
refer to it as logical aggregation theory. As well as being more informative,
this name also has the advantage of marking a clean separation with the
preceding theory of probabilistic aggregation. In a broad view of judgments,
which is in fact the common sense one, subjective certainty is not inherent
to them, and the statements that express them may not have the full force
of the values "true" and "false", the only ones considered by standard logic.
If today’s theory were also concerned with this view, it should include the
theory of probabilistic aggregation; but that is far from the case, the former
having been created without the support of the latter, and both still being
unaware of each other apart from a few exceptions.1
As a matter of fact, it is logic to which the new theory has turned
for technical help. Essentially, it assumes that the individual or collective
subject who is making a judgment contemplates the proposition associated
with it, and either aﬃrms it in giving it the value "true" or denies it by
giving it the value "false". The theory also allows the subject not to make
any judgment, in which case he attributes no truth value to the proposition.
That sketch is fleshed out by introducing a symbolic language with a formula
for each proposition, and then, as in any logical work, a logical syntax or its
semantic analogue to operate on these formulas. Propositional logic suﬃces
1The theory of probabilistic aggregation goes back to the 60s with the work of Stone,
Raiﬀa and Winkler. The main results were obtained quickly, so that the survey by Genest
and Zidekh (1986) remains up to date. In McConway (1981), the theory follows the
axiomatic style of social choice theory, whereas in Lehrer and Wagner (1981), it takes the
diﬀerent form of a theory of consensus applicable to scientific activity.
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even for some advanced results, but we will push this article in the direction
of less elementary logics.
It is with List and Pettit (2002) that an aggregation theory incorporated
— for the first time rigorously — the logical analysis of judgment that we
just outlined. Before that, two American legal theorists, Kornhauser and
Sager (1986, 1993) had outlined an aggregative conception of judgment,
but only taken in the judiciary, and not the broader philosophical, sense.
They showed that collegiate courts were subject to the so-called doctrinal
paradox : individually coherent opinions of judges can lead the court as
a group to inconsistency. In a seminal article that prepares the formalism
later introduced with List, Pettit (2001) reexamines Kornhauser and Sager’s
paradox and, judging it too specific, proposes reformulating it as a universal
problem that he calls the discursive dilemma. By and large, the logical
aggregation literature has adhered to the discursive dilemma version of the
problem, turning its back on the doctrinal paradox version, so it matters a
great deal to understand how they diﬀer. Unlike most contributors, we draw
a sharp contrast between the two problems. This is the major guiding insight
of the article, as it will influence both its review part and its more original
conclusions. In the end, we will show that the much neglected doctrinal
paradox can be used as a departure point for a branch of logical aggregation
theory whose results are yet more general than those of the main trunk. We
expand here on Dietrich and Mongin (2010) without reproducing their full
technical exposition.
Without List and Pettit being aware of it, a French scholar of social
mathematics, Guilbaud (1952), had already set about generalizing from
preference to judgment. Inspired by Arrow, who had just published his
book, but also by Condorcet, whose work he was to help rescue from obliv-
ion, Guilbaud reformulated the former’s theory of aggregation as the latter
would have done, that is: not only for relations of preference, but for all
sorts of "opinions".1 Opposed to the Bourbakianism that then dominated
French mathematics, Guilbaud rejected the axiomatic method and even es-
chewed general proofs, which makes it complicated to evaluate the extent of
his contribution, but the trend today is to see him as a direct forerunner of
logical aggregation theory.2
1Guilbaud prefers the term "opinion", from Condorcet, to "judgment", which he still
uses sometimes.
2Monjardet (2003) singles out in Guilbaud a theorem still of the Arrovian style, but
Eckert and Monjardet (2009) credit him with one of the judgment aggregation style, and
this reading is more faithful; see also Mongin (2012). On the technical side, Guilbaud
made the first use of filters and ultrafilters, notions which had just begun to enter the
mathematics of his time. Since Kirman and Sondermann (1972), aggregative theories
have often used this technique.
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If we must find a first source for the current work, Condorcet is the
only choice, with his Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des
décisions à rendre à la pluralité des voix (1785) and his other treatises or
articles on mathematical politics. His abiding method is to treat a preference
as the accepting or rejecting of certain propositions. The voter who prefers A
to B, B to C, and A to C, accepts "A is preferable to B", "B is preferable to
C", "A is preferable to C", and rejects the contrary propositions. One would
think, under Arrow’s influence, that Condorcet only describes preference
orderings in a roundabout way, but that is far from the case. He starts with
propositions and their supposed logical connections, and he only attributes
the ordering property to the preference relation in virtue of these logical
connections. The greater generality of his reasoning is better seen in the jury
theorem than in the voting paradox, but the latter is still representative. He
analyzes it by writing that the propositions chosen by the majority constitute
an "inconsistent system" (Essai, p. LV-LVI), and this suggests that logical
coherence, and not preferability, is the crux of the matter. Reread in this
manner, which is Guilbaud’s, Condorcet becomes the distant precursor of
the doctrinal paradox, of the discursive dilemma and of all the ongoing
research.
Regrettably, we will touch on Condorcet only in connection with the
paradox of voting, whereas the jury theorem would also be relevant to our
theoretical purposes. First of all, the theorem illustrates even more clearly
than the paradox that collective judgments raise problems of their own,
beside what can be said of collective preferences. Second, unlike the paradox,
it involves the two concepts of an objective truth and the probability of
reaching it - remember Condorcet’s statement of the judges’ deliberation
in Essai. New aggregative issues emerge when the framework of judgment
aggregation is enriched to take these concepts into account. Third and not
last, some writers have managed to connect the Condorcet jury theorem
with the current theory, and this has even become a strand of literature
by itself. To include it would have made the already substantial account
untractable.3
This article essentially consists of a long circular development around
the doctrinal paradox. Section 2 presents the paradox, returning to the ini-
tial judiciary source, then compares it to its reinterpretation as a discursive
dilemma. The sharp contrast drawn between the two problems will colour
the rest of the paper. Section 3 presents the formal framework of current
logical aggregation theory. In a brief aside, we comment on the philoso-
phy of judgment that underlies the chosen definitions, arguing that they
3See in particular Bovens and Rabinowicz (2004), Pigozzi (2006), Hartmann and
Pigozzi (2007), Hartmann, Pigozzi and Sprenger (2010), Hartmann and Sprenger (forth-
coming).
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reflect a typically modern conception of judgment, as opposed to the old,
Aristotelian one. From section 3 onwards, a sequence of impossibility results
follows. That of List and Pettit (Theorem 1) imposes the questionable axiom
of systematicity on the collective judgment function, whereas those stated
in section 4, due to Pauly and van Hees, Dietrich, Mongin, and Nehring
and Puppe (Theorems 2—5), only require independence, a normatively more
defensible axiom that is close to the famous Arrovian one of independence
of irrelevant alternatives. Section 5 is another interlude in the style of philo-
sophical logic. It sets out, with improvements, Dietrich’s general logic, which
overcomes a limitation of Theorems 1-4 (they are formulated in propositional
logics, and this is too specific). The general logic is axiomatized here in two
equivalent ways that diﬀer by their choices of primitive concepts - inference
in one case and inconsistency in the other. (This section is technical and can
be skipped by those willing to take for granted the logical apparatus of the
theory: an executive summary awaits them at the beginning of the next.)
In section 6, against the background of the general logic, we present those
theorems which best structure the field today and can, because of this, be
considered canonical. They have as their mathematical object the agenda,
i.e., the set of logical formulas standing for the propositions about which the
individuals and the group express opinions. The conditions placed on this
object turn any collective judgment function that is subjected to certain ax-
ioms into a degenerate rule, such as dictatorship or oligarchy. Importantly,
these agenda conditions are not only suﬃcient, but also necessary for the
axiomatized function to degenerate, so that the theorems state possibilities
no less than impossibilities. All researchers in the field have made some
contribution here, but Nehring and Puppe on the one hand, and Dokow and
Holzman on the other, stand out; in Theorems 6 and 7, we rely on the lat-
ter team’s version. Section 7 returns to the doctrinal paradox to give that
its own theoretical development, along the lines of Dietrich and Mongin’s
work. It shows how the framework of logical aggregation theory, which was
initially intended for the discursive dilemma, can be adapted to the other
problem. This leads to Theorems 8 and 9, which are then thoroughly ap-
plied to Kornhauser and Sager’s court example. The last section summarizes
conclusions and open problems.
2 From the doctrinal paradox to the discursive
dilemma
Early forerunners aside, logical aggregation theory originates in the analysis
of the legal institution laid out by Kornhauser and Sager (1986, 1993; see
also Kornhauser, 1992). From this analysis, the doctrinal paradox emerged
as a major finding. Here we restore it in its original judiciary terms, distin-
guishing it carefully from the transformations it underwent in Pettit (2001)
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and List and Pettit (2002). Presenting it as a discursive dilemma, these
authors opened the way to logical aggregation theory, but - we will argue -
they also swept aside some significant conceptual concerns.
The doctrinal paradox occurs for the first time in Kornhauser (1992) but
becomes central only in Kornhauser and Sager (1993), where it is illustrated
by the following - by now famous, and even a little tired - example. A
plaintiﬀ  , has brought a civil suit against a defendant , alleging a breach
of contract between them. The court is composed of three judges , 
and , who must, based on contract law, determine whether or not  owes
damages to  , a decision represented by the logical formulas  or ¬. The
case brings up two issues, i.e., whether the contract was valid or not in the
first instance ( or ¬), and whether  was or not in breach of it ( and ¬),
and the law decides for all possible responses, stipulating that  must pay
damages to  if, and only if, both issues are answered in the aﬃrmative.
Suppose that the judges’ deliberations lead them to the following responses
and conclusions:
  ¬ ¬
 ¬  ¬
   
If the court rules directly on the case using simple majority voting, it will
arrive at the conclusion ¬, against the plaintiﬀ. However it can, still using
the same voting rule, first decide on the two issues, and then draw a con-
clusion about the case based on the law, and this will return the answers 
and , hence finally , in favour of the plaintiﬀ.
To avoid misunderstandings, it is worth adding that the actual US con-
tract law is more complex than is said here. Kornhauser and Sager also
examine genuine cases, but they are too intricate to be strikingly paradoxi-
cal, and the authors therefore conceived of the present toy example, which
came somewhat late in their joint work.4 Their ultimate target is to inves-
tigate how the law changes when judiciary decisions have a collective form.
Concretely, the only collegiate courts in the American legal system are the
appellate courts of the States and of the Union. Everyone has heard of the
Supreme Court, whose nine judges reach their decisions about federal cases
through deliberation and - sometimes but not always - explicit voting. Less
well known are the State appellate courts, often composed of three judges,
and above them, the State supreme courts, which operate similarly.
Beside being exemplified, the doctrinal paradox can be defined in the
abstract. This requires some relevant legal concepts to be introduced first,
4Logical aggregation theorists usually locate the doctrinal paradox already in Korn-
hauser and Sager (1986), but this is not the proper reference.
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as in Kornhauser (1992), and we review them sketchily. A case brought be-
fore a court is subjected by this court to a characterization, which amounts
to defining what part of the law, if any, is relevant to it. This inquiry leads
the court to delineate the legal doctrine, which, once applied to the case,
will provide its complete resolution. The doctrine relies on an admixture of
statutes and common law, depending on the case at hand; given the Anglo-
American tradition, the former will prevail in criminal matters, and the
latter in civil matters. The more jurisprudence is involved, the closer the
judges’ activity to law-making, and the more entangled their deliberation.
Logically, the doctrine does two things at once, i.e., it fixes the issues that
the case presents, and it translates possible decisions on these issues into
decisions on the case. This is captured by assuming that there are unam-
biguous questions - to be answered by yes or no - for both the case and each
issue, and that the legal doctrine dictates an answer to the case once all
answers to the issues have been collected.
The preceding concepts are suﬃcient only if there is a single judge. If
the court is collegial, one has also to describe how individual answers are
aggregated into a final judgment. Kornhauser and Sager contemplate two
possibilities. The first has the court record directly individual answers about
the case and apply some collective decision-making procedure, like simple
majority voting, to them. In the second, individual answers about each
issue are recorded, and the collective decision-making procedure is applied
to each of these separately, after which the answer about the case follows
from applying the legal doctrine. The doctrinal paradox arises any time
that the first method, which is case-by-case, does not yield the same result
as the second, which is issue-by-issue. That is the authoritative definition in
Kornhauser (1992, p. 453, where it appears for the first time), Kornhauser
and Sager (1993, p. 10-12) and subsequent legal theorists.5
There is an interesting contrast between Condorcet’s voting paradox
and Kornhauser and Sager’s. The former does not already indicate where to
search for solutions, but the latter does, since it is defined precisely in terms
of their discord. It therefore has a structural quality which brings it already
close to an impossibility theorem. Furthermore, being abstract, it allows
for more than one interpretation. One may say that there are colleagues
who decide simultaneously, but this is not the only possible view, nor is it
the most interesting from the legal perspective. In the above example, the
three judges might have sitted apart, each arriving at a decision for him-
self, whereas a fourth judge, involved after them, would ask how to make
the best of the jurisprudence thus created. Can he only retain the answers
on the case, or should he make use of the answers on the issues? As we
5Post and Salop’s (1991—1992) work seems partly independent of Kornhauser and
Sager’s. For the subsequent law literature, see Nash’s (2003) critical review.
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read them, Kornhauser and Sager initially concerned themselves with the
collective functioning of courts primarily from the angle of their diachronic
consistency. If, once they had discovered the paradox, they focussed on
synchronic consistency, we believe that this is simply for intellectual conve-
nience. Of the two problems, the first is more important than the second,
because it aﬀects all courts, collective as well as individual, and all the more
when common law tends to outweigh statutes in determining the law. How-
ever, the first problem being also more diﬃcult, it was good policy to start
with the second.6
If there is anything paradoxical in the clash between the case-by-case and
issue-by-issue methods, it is because each can rely on a solid normative ar-
gument. By deciding case-by-case, the court fully respects the deliberations
of individual judges, right up until the decisions they would make, were they
alone in adjudicating the case. By deciding issue-by-issue, the court guaran-
tees that its decision is based on the same type of reasons - those allowed by
the legal doctrine - as the judges’ individual decisions. According to Korn-
hauser and Sager, "where the doctrinal paradox arises, judgment and reason
are immediately and inexorably pulled apart" (1993, p. 25). By "reason",
they classically mean one’s ability to justify conclusions using logic. As they
assume that each judge exercises this capacity competently, the question is
whether it holds at the group’s level, and the issue-by-issue method arguably
ensures that it does. By "judgment", they mean a conclusion obtained by
the case-by-case method, and indirectly, the supporting argument just said
that this method gives careful attention to individual judgments. In List
and Pettit (2002, p. 94), the conflicting principles are called "collective ra-
tionality" and "individual responsiveness", a more explicit terminology that
we will retain from now on.
Beyond the psychological shock of the paradox, the clash between the
two methods poses a dilemma, in the usual sense of a forced choice between
two unsatisfactory options, since the argument to want one is also an ar-
gument not to want the other, and even a theoretical dilemma, since two
basic principles clash, as was just explained. Pettit (2001), then List and
Pettit (2002), definitely move the doctrinal paradox in this abstract direc-
tion. However, the novelty of the discursive dilemma, which they promote
as an alternative concept, cannot lie just in this reinterpretation. It must
also go beyond the authors’ claim that the doctrinal paradox occurs out-
side of the legal context, because this is so immediately obvious. Pettit
points in particular to the deliberative entities of democratic institutions,
6When they call case-by-case one of the solutions to the synchronic problem, Korn-
hauser and Sager may still be echoing the diachronic version, for which this expression
is more appropriate. List (2004) is the only logical aggregation theorist ever to have
addressed that version.
9
review panels and authorities of economic regulation, clubs or other groups
whose members coopt, and even, to some degree, political parties, unions
and churches. Being a matter of empirical observation, the list can go on.
The only problematic item is the whole of political society, which Pettit
chooses to include, relying as he does on the theory of deliberative democ-
racy that he has defended elsewhere (on this line, see also Brennan, 2001).
This speculative extension of the doctrinal paradox also goes beyond the
normal range of the discursive dilemma, and so cannot really mean a diﬀer-
ence between the two. Nor is the distinction clarified by Pettit’s labelling
of the two methods as the "premiss-driven way" and the "conclusion-driven
way" (2002, p. 274). This new contrast, which List and Pettit (2002) passed
on to logical aggregation theorists, is simply a useful reminder that the legal
distinction between the issues and the case can be put more abstractly (the
currently received terms, to be used henceforth, are the premiss-based versus
the conclusion-based method).
What substantially distinguishes the discursive dilemma from the doc-
trinal paradox is not to be found on the interpretive side, as in the previous
suggestions, but rather on the formal side. Here is how List and Pettit (2002)
reconstruct the judiciary example. They associate formulas of classical logic
to all relevant considerations, including the legal doctrine, for which they
take ←→  ∧  (" if and only if  and ") Supposing then that the court
votes on each formula, they bring to light the logical contradiction that it
would face:   ¬ ¬ ←→  ∧ 
 ¬  ¬ ←→  ∧ 
    ←→  ∧ 
   ¬ ←→  ∧ 
Whereas the doctrinal paradox was defined in terms of two methods to relate
conclusions to premisses, the discursive dilemma is defined by a contradic-
tion within the overall collective judgment, without the need to distinguish
between premisses and conclusions. Presented in this way, the problem
falls within the scope of classical propositional logic, and it thus opens the
way to an attractive formalism of judgment aggregation. In retrospect, the
successful development of logical aggregation theory suggests that it was
reformulated appropriately.
Still, if one is concerned to deepen the doctrinal paradox within its orig-
inal context, there are some reasons to doubt that List and Pettit opened
the right path. Indeed, in this context, their wide-ranging definition of col-
lective judgment is questionable for two reasons. For one, the distinction
between the issues and the case gave its fine structure to the judiciary deci-
sion problem, and by ignoring it, one simply destroys the connections with
legal theory; our brief discussion of jurisprudential reasoning can flesh out
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this objection. For another, the legal doctrine calls for a separate logical
analysis, but List and Pettit make it unspecific. To unpack the critique
here, they take it for granted (i) that the doctrine can be represented by a
formula of classical propositional logic, like the propositions describing the
issues and the case, and (ii) that it falls under the scope of the same decision
rule as these propositions. It transpires from Kornhauser and Sager’s later
writings that they have doubts about logical aggregation theory, but they
have never expressed them fully.7 As we suggest, the disagreement could
relate to (i), (ii), or even more radically, the underlying claim (iii) that the
doctrine is a proposition rather than a command or a rule. Section 7 touches
on this last objection and takes the first two more thoroughly into account.
3 The formal framework of logical aggregation the-
ory
The theory is developed from the specific notions of agenda, judgment sets,
and the collective judgment function, as well as a small set of axioms to be
put on this mapping, and various conditions to be put on the agenda and
the judgment sets. This section and the following one present the theory
with a minimum of logical details, only developing the formal language,
and postponing until section 5 the full definitions of the logic properly (i.e.,
inference and associated notions).
By definition, a language L of the theory is a set of formulas     
containing logical symbols taken from a certain set S. It is not necessary to
specify the formulas beyond the minimal requirement that S contains the
symbol for Boolean negation ¬ ("not") and L is closed for this symbol; i.e.,
if  ∈ L, then ¬ ∈ L. If S contains other elements, they will be symbols
for the remaining Boolean connectives, ∨ ("or"), ∧ ("and"), → ("if . . . ,
then . . . "), ↔ ("if and only if . . . , then . . . ") or for non-Boolean operators
representing modalities (e.g., "it is obligatory that . . . ", "it is desirable that
. . . ", "it is known that . . . ", or "if . . . , then . . . " taken in a non-Boolean
sense, typically with a counterfactual interpretation). For each additional
symbol of S, the corresponding closure rule holds: if ∧ ∈ S, the rule says
that if  ∈ L and  ∈ L then ∧ ∈ L, and so on. We distinguish classical
and non-classical languages according to whether, respectively, S contains
only Boolean symbols or others in addition.
In the very large class of permitted languages, the particular case of
propositional languages LP stands out. They are defined in terms of a set
7A debate took place between Kornhauser and Sager (2004) and List and Pettit (2005),
but it does not identify the disputes as clearly as one might like.
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P of elementary formulas, or propositional variables, which do not contain
any logical symbols, and a set S containing the five Boolean connective
symbols. Since these connectives are inter-definable, we can equivalently
have {¬ } ⊆ S, replacing the dot with any one of ∨, ∧, → or ↔. Classical
propositional languages are those for which {¬ } = S.
By a calculus of the theory, we mean a language L together with a logic,
i.e., a system of axioms and rules that determine the inferential and other
logical links between the formulas of L. Just as with the language, there is
no need to specify this system in its entirety. Section 5 will show that it
suﬃces to have an inference relation  `  defined for  ⊂ L and  ∈ L,
respecting some very general restrictions, but here and in the next section,
we restrict ourselves to the special case of classical propositional calculi.
Such calculi have classical propositional languages, and for their logic part,
well-known systems of axioms and rules that fit the ordinary mathematical
intuition; the interested reader may consult any logic text. These unstated,
but obvious systems will for now fix the meaning of the inference rule `
and of its associated notions, like logical truth, logical contradiction, logical
equivalence, logical independence, consistency and inconsistency. Classical
propositional calculi draw our attention only because they are so elementary.
We used one of these like Jourdain used prose when formalizing the judiciary
example in the discursive dilemma version. The language then was LP , built
from P = {  } and  = {¬↔}, and the set { ¬  ↔  ∧ } was
contradictory in the sense of any textbook system.
In L, the theory fixes a subset  representing the propositions that are
in question for the members of the group; this is the agenda. It can be
large or small depending on the application, but in all generality it is only
required to be non-empty and, as with L, closed for negation. The judiciary
agenda in discursive dilemma style is:
 = {   ↔  ∧ ¬¬¬¬(↔  ∧ )}.
If we were to add to the agenda multiple negations ¬¬¬¬¬   , the logic
would in the end reduce them to either  or ¬. It is better to anticipate
that process and define agendas as sets:
 = {   }±,
where      are positive (non-negated) formulas and the superscript ±
indicates that they are accompanied with their negations ¬¬  To sim-
plify matters, we impose the restriction - going beyond what the theory
needs - that agendas consist of contingent formulas, i.e., are neither logical
truths, nor logical contradictions.
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The theory represents individual and group judgments by subsets of ,
judgment sets, which can be made to fulfil certain logical constraints, the
primary one being consistency. They will be denoted by 0    generally,
and by  0    0    when they belong to, respectively, individuals 
and the group they form. A formula  from one of these sets represents a
proposition, in the ordinary sense of a semantic object endowed with a truth
value. If  is used also to represent a judgment, in the sense of a cognitive
operation, then it is in virtue of the natural interpretive rule:
(R)  (the group) judges that  iﬀ  ∈  (resp. iﬀ  ∈ ).
We treat the formula  in this statement as if it were itself the proposition;
this terminological ease is commonplace in logic and will be taken for granted
in what follows. Thanks to (R), judgments obey a distinction between two
types of negation, internal and external, which has no analogue on the level
of propositions or formulas, these being negated in only one way. Indeed,
"judging that not" (¬ ∈ ) is diﬀerent from "not judging that" ( ∈ ).
Once the inference relation is defined, the logical consistency of judgment
sets will relate one negation to the other as could be expected, i.e., "judging
that not" will entail "not judging that", without the converse always holding.
From what we have said, it can be seen that logical aggregation the-
ory is connected to a particular philosophical conception of judgments and
propositions. The language L represents all expressible propositions, i.e., all
propositions that can become the object of a judgment, but only those in
 will actually become so. It is typical of the modern concepts of proposi-
tion and judgment — since Frege and Russell — that the former has a wider
range than the latter; this definitely clashes with the ancient view — that
of Aristotle, which is still to be found in Kant.8 Logical aggregation the-
ory uses the Fregean concept of assertion, here rendered as  ∈ , and
as can be checked, it is faithful to the principle, also typically modern and
Fregean, that assertion remains unaﬀected by logical operators. For it does
not matter whether  is positive or negative, conditional or unconditional,
modal or non-modal; the indicator chosen for assertion — set membership —
works always in the same way. Of course the modern conception does allow
distinctions which are made by the logic to be lifted to judgments. Thus
one may speak of a "positive judgment" or "negative judgment" of , to
mean that  or ¬, respectively, belongs to the judgment set in question;
emphatically, it is only the negation sign, or lack thereof, in front of  that
diﬀerentiates the two cases.
8Kant’s Logic, published in 1800, is a famous sample of the ancient view. The modern
one is best exemplified by Frege’s Logical Investigations (1918—1919). Vickers (1989) has
a crisp summary of their diﬀerences.
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Returning from this philosophical excursus to the formal framework, we
index the individuals by  = 1     , assuming that  ≥ 2, and define the
collective judgment function, which associates a collective judgment set to
each configuration, or profile, of judgment sets for the  individuals:
 =  (1     )
Like social choice theory, logical aggregation theory usually deals with fi-
nite sets of individuals.9 As a generalization of the Arrovian social welfare
function,  formalizes the decision rules that the group would apply to the
formulas in the agenda. According to its standard definition, the only one
considered here,  has a universal domain, i.e., is defined on the set of all
possible profiles, given the logical constraints imposed on judgment sets.
These constraints, to be explained in the next paragraph, may also aﬀect
the range of  .10
A judgment set  can be expected to be:
• deductively closed, i.e., for all  ∈ , if  `  then  ∈ ;
• consistent, i.e., for no  ∈  do we have  `  and  ` ¬;
• complete, i.e., for all  ∈ , either  ∈  or ¬ ∈ .
Various families of judgment sets result from combining these properties.
The main cases are:
• the set  of consistent and complete judgment sets, which satisfy the
three properties or, equivalently, the last two (the first easily follows
from them),
• the set ∗ '  of consistent and deductively closed judgment sets, as
defined by the first two properties.
From there, one can define restrictions on the domain and range of 
such as:
(i)  :  → ,
(ii)  :  → ∗,
(iii)  : (∗) → ∗,
(iv)  :  → 2 or  : (∗) → 2 .
9Dietrich and Mongin (2007), and then Herzberg and Eckert (2010) and Herzberg
(2010), have looked at infinite sets. Their results translate those already obtained in
social choice theory, in particular by Kirman and Sonderman (1972).
10Logical aggregation theory is only now beginning to look at restricted domains; see
List (2003) and Dietrich and List (2010a).
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In the beginning, only (i) was considered. It makes proofs easier but is
called into question by cognitive psychology, which would favour weaker
logical hypotheses. One can also — a more elaborate argument — question (i)
by calling upon the modern notion of judgment that underlies the formalism.
By ruling out abstention,  destroys the possibility it oﬀers of dealing with
a proposition without having to assert it or its negation. In other words, the
theory loses the distinction between internal and external negation, since
"not judging" becomes equivalent to "judging that not". There is therefore
more than one reason to develop the options based on ∗, i.e., (ii) and (iii).
Case (iv), in which individual and collective judgment sets are markedly
diﬀerent, is only given to help explain the others.
Two ways of formalizing collective judgment rules suggest themselves:
one can either define  so that it coincides with a particular rule, or de-
termine  by axiomatic conditions representing general principles to be
satisfied by any rule. The same two possibilities occur concerning the social
welfare function, and as its record shows, one gets the most by following both
paths at the same time.11 Proposition-wise majority voting, which is the de-
cision rule associated with the judiciary example, will illustrate the process.
This rule is defined here as the collective judgment function  :  → 2
such that, for every profile (1     ) of the domain,
(1  ) = { ∈  : |{ :  ∈ }| ≥ },
with  = +12 if  is odd and  = 2 + 1 if  is even.
Note that the range is not  because there can be unbroken ties between
 and ¬ when  is even, and it is not even ∗ in view of the judiciary
example, which exhibits an inconsistent collective judgment set. Having
defined proposition-wise majority, we introduce its salient normative prop-
erties. This section mentions three such properties, defined abstractly for
any  , that together allow for the easy proof of an impossibility theorem
— the first to have occurred in the literature. The list will be extended in
section 4 with more advanced results.
Systematicity. For every pair of formulas  ∈ , and for every
pair of profiles (1     ), (01     0), if, for every  = 1     , the
equivalence  ∈  ⇔  ∈ 0 holds, then so does the equivalence
 ∈  (1     ))⇔  ∈  (01     0).
11 It is because there are two such paths that the method of social choice theory bears
some analogy with the axiomatic method of formal logic. For the definition of the rules, say
majority voting, plays the role of semantic models with respect to the syntax constituted
by the axioms, say IIA, and characterization theorems approximate completeness theorems
proved in logic. More on this in Mongin (2003).
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Systematicity means that the group, when confronted with a profile of
individual judgment sets, gives the same answer concerning a formula as
they would give concerning a diﬀerent formula, when faced with a diﬀerent
profile, whenever the individual judgments concerning the first formula in
the first profile are the same as the individual judgments concerning the
second formula in the second profile. The rule  clearly respects system-
aticity, whose analogue in social choice theory is neutrality (see, e.g., Sen,
1970, and d’Aspremont, 1985).
We will say that a collective judgment function  is a dictatorship if
there is one individual  such that, for every profile (1     ),
 (1     ) =  .
Given the universal domain assumption, there is only one such  per dicta-
torship, to be called the dictator. Obviously  satisfies:
Non-dictatorship.  is not a dictatorship
and even more strongly:
Anonymity. For every profile (1     ), if (01     0) is obtained
from (1     ) by permuting the individuals, then
 (1     ) =  (01     0).
The parallel with social choice theory is again clear. Note however that Ar-
row’s (1963) dictator imposes only his strict preference, not his indiﬀerence,
which means that dictatorship for him is not a projection property, as it is
here.
The theory’s first result made clear the conflict between anonymity and
systematicity under a minor condition being imposed on  (List and Pettit,
2002, Theorem 1). In fact, the conflict can be expressed more strongly as
that between non-dictatorship and systematicity (Pauly and van Hees, 2006,
Theorem 4) and we therefore present that improved version of the result.
Theorem 1 (Pauly and van Hees, 2006, generalizing List and
Pettit, 2002) Let LP be a classical propositional language with S = {¬∧};
let   ∈ P be two distinct propositional variables such that    ∧  ∈
; then there is no  :  →  satisfying both non-dictatorship and
systematicity.
Since  satisfies non-dictatorship and systematicity on , it must,
by contraposition of the theorem, have a range other than . When  is
odd, the collective judgment sets are complete, so one of (1     )
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must be inconsistent. This is exactly what the judiciary example in discur-
sive dilemma form has taught, but the theoretical deduction supersedes the
earlier finding, which was restricted to specific LP ,  and . Beside gener-
alizing its main example, Theorem 1 deepens the conceptual meaning of the
discursive dilemma. "Collective rationality" is reflected in the assumption
that the range of  is , "individual responsiveness" in the non-dictatorship
condition, but what about the systematicity axiom, which is related to nei-
ther? Although List and Pettit think of their formal analysis as mirroring
their informal one, it rather seems that the value of Theorem 1 lies in its
correcting primary intuitions. As it makes clear, the problem of collective
judgment is in fact a trilemma with systematicity as an additional element.
Unlike the other two, this property has no normative standing, and can only
be defended in terms of its technical advantages. Nonetheless, it is involved
just as much as the others in the impossibility conclusion.12
Among the many voting rules that Theorem 1 covers, we single out those
which rely on a qualified majority. For any  such that 1 ≤  ≤  - the quota
- define   :  → 2 thus: for every profile (1     ) of the domain,
 (1     ) = { ∈  : |{ :  ∈ }| ≥ }
In the limit case where  = , a formula is collectively accepted if and
only if all individuals accept it, a unanimity rule to be compared with the
Pareto extension rule of social choice theory (see Sen, 1970, ch.5*, and 1986).
Clearly, the   functions cannot go to , since some collective judgment
sets are inconsistent for low  values, and others are incomplete for high
 values (where proposition-wise majority voting defines the cut-oﬀ betwen
"low" and "high"). Theorem 1 accounts for these failures at one go, thus
illustrating the unifying power for which the axiomatic method is classically
famous.13
In summary, against the straightforward background of a classical propo-
sitional calculus, new concepts take their shape: the agenda; individual and
collective judgment sets; and the collective judgment function that connects
them. The last concept permits dealing with both specific rules and gen-
eral conditions. With this technology, the discursive dilemma was recast as
an abstract impossibility of collective judgment. However, Theorem 1 only
brushes the surface of the possible arguments.
12The basic weakness of the axiom is that it cancels out semantic diﬀerences between
propositions (see Mongin, 2008). When premisses and conclusions are distinguished, an-
other problem is that it makes them interchangeable, whereas the former serve as reasons
for the latter and not vice-versa (see Chapman, 2002).
13Quota rules are defined here as in Dietrich and List (2007a), who, after Nehring and
Puppe (2002, 2008), study them in detail; see also Dietrich (2010).
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4 Theorems based on the independence axiom
Pursuing the example of voting rules, we now introduce three other salient
properties that they typically satisfy, i.e., unanimity preservation, indepen-
dence, monotonicity. The theorems below, which extend List and Pettit’s in
various ways, rely on these new axiomatic conditions. The first in the list
requires the collectivity to reproduce the individuals’ unanimous judgments.
In the present framework, unanimity may be applied either to the judgment
sets themselves, or — more strongly — to their formulas considered one by
one. The parallel with systematicity, and indeed with other conditions that
are to follow, is made clearer if we opt for the latter variant, which is also
the closest analogue of the Pareto conditions in social choice theory.
Unanimity preservation. For every formula  ∈  and every profile
(1     ), if  ∈  for every  = 1     , then  ∈  (1     ).
The second condition is a weakening of systematicity, hence the  
functions automatically satisfy it.
Independence. For every formula  ∈  and every pair of profiles
(1     ), (01     0), if for every  = 1     , the equivalence  ∈ ⇔  ∈ 0 holds, then so does the equivalence:
 ∈  (1     )⇔  ∈  (01     0).
Independence is the same as restricting systematicity to the case where
 = . It eliminates the conceptual element of neutrality, i.e., of indiﬀerence
to the semantic content of propositions, while preserving another conceptual
element which dovetails with it in the earlier condition, that is: the collective
judgment of  depends only on the individual judgments of . To put
it diﬀerently, the set  is defined formula-wise from the sets 1     .
The theory can only express this idea by comparing a given profile with
hypothetical profiles, in which the individual judgments on  6=  may be
diﬀerent while those on  stay the same. The axiom, including its multi-
profile formulation, is closely related to Arrow’s independence of irrelevant
alternatives.14
Voting rules typically satisfy a strengthening property: when a collective
result reflects the judgment of a group of voters, the result still holds if more
voters join the group in their judgment. Like the related condition of positive
responsiveness in one version of Arrow’s theory, this requires a multi-profile
formulation.15
14Despite the significant weakening of systematicity, some normative objections remain
against independence (see Mongin, 2008).
15The 1951 version of Arrow’s theorem relied on positive responsiveness, while the 1963
and still current version uses a Pareto condition. More on the former in Sen (1970).
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Monotonicity. For every formula  ∈ , and for every pair of profiles
(1     ), (01     0), if the implication  ∈  ⇒  ∈ 0 holds for
every  = 1     , with at least one  such that  ∈  and  ∈ 0, then
the following implication holds:
 ∈  (1     )⇒  ∈  (01     0).
Independence clearly does not imply monotonicity, and as the next ex-
ample shows, neither does systematicity. A collective judgment function 
is an anti-dictatorship, if there is  such that for every (1     ) and
every  ∈ ,
 ∈  ⇔  ∈  (1     ).
Under the appropriate agenda restriction,16  has domain  and range
. It is systematic, but not monotonic, as illustrated by two profiles
(1     ) and (01     0) such that ¬ ∈  ,  ∈ 0 and  = 0 for
all  6= . Henceforth, monotonic independence and monotonic systematicity
refer to the conjunction of the monotonicity axiom with the independence
or systematicity axiom, respectively.
If the impossibility conclusion of Theorem 1 could be derived from in-
dependence instead of systematicity, this would deepen the explanation of
the discursive dilemma. The theory would then shift the problem of collec-
tive judgment to one of the two conceptual elements, namely formula-wise
aggregation, from the other, neutrality. Systematicity would certainly re-
main in the conclusion — dictatorial functions, the only ones existing from
Theorem 1, do satisfy this property — but it would be better not to have
it in the assumptions. In that way, one would also re-establish the parallel
with social choice theory, where the strongest results deal with indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives as an assumption, neutrality serving only as
an intermediary step.17
This programme was realized by Pauly and van Hees (2006, Theorem
4) and Dietrich (2006, Theorem 1, Corollary 2), who posit independence
as their starting point, and also by Mongin (2008, Theorem 2), who, unlike
them, also requires unanimity preservation to hold. Both Pauly and van Hees
and Dietrich derived the latter condition in the course of their proofs. This
leads to an impressive ratio of conclusions to assumptions, but one could
want to make more explicit the two very diﬀerent principles that are at
work simultaneously. In order to have unanimity preservation as a separate
16For every consistent subset  ⊆ , the negated subset {¬ :  ∈ } is also consistent.
17Here, logical aggregation theory and social choice theory have followed opposite paths.
Arrow’s 1951 theorem started with independence of irrelevant alternatives, and it was only
later and for special cases that some theorems proceeded from neutrality. Fleurbaey and
Mongin (2005) reexamine the historical sequence.
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assumption, Mongin weakens independence so that there is no entailment
anymore. Each of the three axiom sets leads to an impossibility.
The three works have in common that they strengthen the very weak
agenda conditions of Theorem 1; this is the price to pay for replacing sys-
tematicity by independence. Given a language LP , let us say that  is
closed for propositional variables if, for every formula  ∈  and every
propositional variable  ∈ P occurring in ,  ∈ . For example,  verifies
this closure condition, since  = (↔  ∧ ) ∈  and    ∈ . A literal
is defined as some  ∈ P or its negation ¬; it is denoted by ±. Given that
 is closed by negation, the present closure condition is equivalently stated
by putting ± ∈  instead of  ∈ .
Theorem 2 (Pauly and van Hees, 2006). Let LP be a classical
propositional language with S = {¬∧}; let  be closed for propositional
variables, with at least two distinct propositional variables, and such that,
for all ±± ∈ , ± ∧ ± ∈ ; then every  :  →  satisfying both
non-dictatorship and independence is a constant function.18
A collective judgment function  is constant if there is a judgment set 
such that, for every profile (1     ),  (1     ) = . The case arises
when one moves from systematicity to independence; indeed, a constant
collective judgment function into  or ∗ satisfies the latter but not the
former.19
Until now we have not made - and we in general will not make - any
assumption concerning the number of propositional variables. However, the
following theorem is best stated with P finite (and so, modulo logical equiv-
alence, LP also finite). We can then define the atoms of LP , which are
the formulas ±1 ∧    ∧±, in which each of the  distinct propositional
variables of P occurs. The set of atoms of LP , to be denoted by AT P , is the
finest logical partition — class of logically exclusive and logically exhaustive
formulas — for this propositional language; in other words, each atom de-
scribes a conceivable state of aﬀairs with maximal precision. Dietrich shows
that, if the agenda contains the atoms, the same conclusion as in Theorem
2 follows, even though independence only applies to these formulas within
the agenda.
Theorem 3 (Dietrich, 2006). Let LP be a classical propositional
language with S = {¬∧} and P finite, containing at least two propositional
18While being classical in the sense of section 3, Pauly and van Hees’s propositional
calculus is unusual in allowing for any finite number of truth values. Van Hees (2007) and
Duddy and Piggins (2009) also go beyond bivalent semantics (to which our syntactical
formalism implicitly subscribes).
19The restriction to  or ∗ is essential. Otherwise, the following  is both constant
and systematic:  (1     ) =  for all (1     ).
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variables; let  include AT P ; then every  :  →  satisfying non-
dictatorship and independence restricted to AT P is a constant function.
For simplicity, we have stated only a special case of the original theorem,
which we now explain in terms of an example. Take P = { } and  =
{¬∧ ¬∧¬}±. This agenda does not contain all the atoms of LP but
nonetheless satisfies a related property, i.e., for every judgment set  ∈ ,
there is a formula in  that is logically equivalent to the conjunction of the
elements of . Indeed,  contains only three judgment sets:
{¬(¬∧)¬(¬∧¬)} {¬¬ ∧ ¬(¬ ∧ ¬)}  {¬¬(¬∧)¬∧¬},
and these can respectively be identified with:
¬ ∧ ¬ ∧ ¬.
Given the restriction of L to , judgment sets in  describe conceivable
states of aﬀairs with maximal precision; so their equivalent formulas may be
defined as the atoms of LP relative to . Dietrich’s result in fact concerns
this notion of atoms, which extends its scope beyond what has been stated
formally.
In this theorem, independence holds only of a subset of the agenda. The
next result restricts the axiom similarly, albeit to a diﬀerent subset, i.e., the
set  of propositional variables occurring in .
Theorem 4 (Mongin, 2008). Let LP be a classical propositional lan-
guage; let  be closed for propositional variables, with at least two propo-
sitional variables, and moreover satisfying the agenda conditions stated in
section 7. Then there is no  :  →  that satisfies non-dictatorship,
unanimity preservation, and independence restricted to  .
Theorems 2, 3 and 4 have a common ground, which is to clarify the
negative role of the independence condition. The first two essentially say
that a collective judgment function degenerates if it proceeds formula-wise
on an agenda whose formulas are logically interconnected. The last theorem
implicitly accepts this diagnosis, since it restricts independence to the only
formulas that - in a classical propositional calculus - are not logically in-
terconnected, i.e., to  . The impossibility conclusion then follows from
adding unanimity preservation, which makes this condition the relevant tar-
get of criticism. In the end, the discursive dilemma comes close to the
problem of spurious unanimity that Mongin (1995, 1997) brought to light
in the context of collective Bayesianism.20
20 Individuals can make the same expected utility comparisons although they diﬀer both
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The judiciary example can serve to illustrate the two analyses just sketched.
According to the first, the court is confronted with problems because it re-
quires the judges to vote on each proposition considered in isolation, whereas
they are logically connected by legal doctrine. According to the second, even
if the court ensures that judges vote on logically independent propositions,
it must still take care to apply unanimity preservation in the right way.
As it happens, the judges are not in agreement about how to make use of
the legal doctrine, and this undercuts the supposed normative force of their
unanimity in this circumstance.
A formal example will make the two steps of this reasoning even more
explicit. Let LP be a propositional language with S = {¬∨} and P =
{  }; let the agenda be  = {   ∨ ∨ }±, which fits the conditions
of Theorem 4; finally, let  = 3 and the profile (1 2 3) ∈ 3 be such
that:
¬¬ ∈ 1;¬ ¬ ∈ 2;¬¬  ∈ 3.
By deductive closure,  ∨  ∨  ∈  for all  = 1 2 3. If the collec-
tive judgment function is  , the collective judgment set  contains
¬¬¬  ∨  ∨  and is thus contradictory. This illustrates the diﬃculty
of formula-wise aggregation, given the logical connection between    es-
tablished by ∨ ∨ , and it reflects the spirit of Theorems 2 and 3.21 Now,
the contradiction would still occur if  were restricted to    and una-
nimity preservation were applied to  ∨  ∨ . This illustrates Theorem 4
and the critical role of spurious unanimity (since the three individuals have
incompatible reasons to accept the same formula  ∨  ∨ ).
As a matter of history, a theorem of Nehring and Puppe (2002), based
on monotonic independence, came before the results just covered. It was not
stated in the formalism of logical aggregation theory, but it is possible to
translate it to there (see Nehring and Puppe, 2010). This theorem belongs
to section 6, and here, we state another result by the same authors in order
to illustrate their condition of monotonic independence at work. Let us say
that a collective judgment function  has a local veto power if there is an
individual  and a formula  ∈  such that, for every profile (1     ),
 ∈  =⇒  ∈  (1     ).
For a given  , there can be several veto holders , each relative to a given
. This is a weak technical variant of dictatorship, bearing some relation to
in their utility and their probability assignments. Mongin (1995) thereby explains the
impossibility of collective Bayesianism. More generally, Mongin (1997) talks of spurious
unanimity when a judgment is collectively agreed by individuals who have conflicting
reasons for arriving at it. Nehring’s (2005) abstract formalism of Paretian aggregation
encapsulates related ideas.
21The spirit, not the letter, since the chosen  does not obey the agenda conditions of
these theorems.
22
Gibbard’s (1969) concept of an oligarchy in social choice theory (a tighter
connection will be made in section 6).
Theorem 5. (Nehring and Puppe, 2008). Let LP be a classical propo-
sitional language; let  be closed for propositional variables, with at least
one contingent formula that is not logically equivalent to a literal. Then
there is no surjective  satisfying monotonic independence and having no
local veto power.
Compared to Theorems 2, 3 and 4, the axioms on  are strengthened.
Independence has been supplemented with monotonicity, which, in the pres-
ence of surjectivity, can be shown to entail unanimity preservation, and the
absence of veto is clearly much more demanding than the absence of a dic-
tator. At the same time, the constraints on  are definitely reduced. Thus,
various trade-oﬀs are possible between conditions placed on the agenda and
on the axioms. Section 6 will develop this observation to the point of speci-
fying meta-theoretical equivalences.
Theorem 5 is brought out here to limit technicalities and facilitate com-
parisons, but Nehring and Puppe have more powerful results (2008, Theo-
rems 1 and 2). They define  to be an oligarchy with default if there are
two non-empty subsets  ⊂  and  ⊂ {1     } such that for every
(1     ) and every  ∈ ,
 ∈  (1     ) iﬀ either  ∈  for all  ∈ ,
or  ∈  and  ∈  for some  ∈ .
The members  ∈ are called the oligarchs, and the set of formulas  the
default. In essence, if the oligarchs agree about a formula , it goes through
to the collective judgment set, and if they are divided, then the default
makes the decision between  or ¬. For certain agendas (we do not give
the conditions here), Nehring and Puppe show that the only  satisfying
monotonic independence and surjectivity are oligarchies with default.22
In summary, with Theorems 2—5, logical aggregation theory further deep-
ens the discursive dilemma. Systematicity has given way to independence,
sometimes posited by itself, sometimes modified by unanimity preservation
or monotonicity. The more recent work favours the coupling of standard in-
dependence and unanimity preservation. Before we come to this, we will in
the next section return to the formal framework of logical aggregation the-
ory, which has not yet been defined in full generality. Readers unconcerned
with these technicalities may go straight to section 6, at the beginning of
which they are summarized informally.
22Nehring and Puppe (2010) drop the condition — called truth-functionality — which
corresponds here to the closure of  for propositional variables. As a result, their agendas
become compatible with non-oligarchic collective judgment functions.
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5 A general logic for the theory
The theorems of sections 3 and 4 were formulated in terms of classical propo-
sitional calculi, which is restrictive. The question arises of extending them
to non-classical propositional calculi, i.e., in which the language comprises
of non-Boolean connectives and the logic has an inference relation diﬀerent
from the standard one. Equally, the question arises of extending them to
predicate calculi, whether classical or not, which improve on the analysis
of propositions by using symbols for predicates, variables and quantifiers.
They strengthen the preceding logics in another direction, and on the appli-
cation side, they are needed to obtain social choice theorems on preference
relations as corollaries of the logical aggregation theorems.
Instead of working in two steps, first by proving a logical aggregation
theorem for elementary calculi, and then checking that it holds for more
advanced ones, it would be better to prove it once and for all in a general
logic that encompasses all the calculi one may be interested in. This goal
was set by Dietrich (2007a), who achieved it by axiomatizing the inference
relation ` without referring to any particular logic. We pursue the same
approach using the improved axiomatization of Dietrich and Mongin (2010).
Henceforth, once a theorem is proved for the general logic, it will suﬃce, in
order for it to apply to a calculus whose language is of type L defined in
section 3, that its inference relation obeys the axioms in question. The
canonical theorem and the further results in section 6 and 7 are stated in
this new formal framework.
Let us fix a binary relation  ` , holding between certain sets  ⊆ L
and certain formulas  ∈ L. We define it to be an inference relation, with
 being then called a set of premisses and  a conclusion, if it satisfies the
following list of six axioms. In their statement,  0  and  `  mean,
respectively, that  `  does not hold and that {} ` .
(E1) There is no  ∈ L such that ∅ `  and ∅ ` ¬ (non-triviality).
(E2) For every  ∈ L,  `  (reflexivity).
(E3) For every  ⊂ L and every  ∈ L, if ∪{} `  or ∪{¬} ` ,
then  `  (single-step completion).
(E4) For every  ⊂ 0 ⊂ L and every  ∈ L, if  ` , then 0 ` 
(monotonicity).
(E5) For every  ⊂ L and every  ∈ L, if  ` , then there is a finite
subset 0 ⊆  such that 0 `  (compactness).
(E6) For every  ⊂ L, if there is  ∈ L such that  `  and  ` ¬,
then for every  ∈ L,  `  (non-paraconsistency).
A further property follows from these:
(E7) For every  ⊂ L and every  ∈ L, if  `  and  `  for every
 ∈  , then  `  (transitivity).
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From this list, (E4) is doubtless the most important condition. It ex-
presses the monotonicity that is typical of deductive inferences, as opposed
to the non-monotonicity typical of inductive inferences, which the following
example illustrates. Suppose that  says that all ravens examined up to time
 are black, and  that all ravens are black. Now, the inductive inference
from  to  no longer holds if  is augmented with  saying that a raven
examined at time  + 1 is not black. Neither the commonsensical, nor the
philosophical concept of judgment appears to be analytically tied with the
concept of deduction; rather, they both draw upon a broader idea of rea-
soning that can accommodate induction.23 One should therefore see (E4)
as a substantial restriction on the judgments the theory is concerned with.
Incidentally, this is another reason to favour the label of logical aggregation
promoted here.
Condition (E1) is essential for non-triviality, especially in the presence
of (E4), and (E2) states a property that one would expect any inference,
whether deductive or inductive, to have. (E3) permits suppressing unneces-
sary premisses, which is appropriate for deductive inferences. This condition
corresponds to a more familiar one, which is stated below in terms of logical
inconsistency. (E5) says that sets of premisses can be taken to be finite,
a property that reflects a general concern among logicians for a tractable
inference concept. This is a restrictive, if desirable, property, so logical ag-
gregation theorists would be well-advised to mention it any time that they
assume it (as is done, say, in the proofs of Dietrich and Mongin, 2010). (E6)
imposes another restriction on the class of permitted inferences, but unlike
(E4) and (E5), it appears to be unproblematic. It excludes a group of de-
ductive calculi - the so-called paraconsistent ones - which have long vexed
logicians and whose peculiar situation we will now explain.
Let I denote the set of inconsistent sets of L-formulas; by definition, a
set will be consistent if and only if it belongs to the complement of I. One
way of formalizing these notions is to define them in terms of the inference
relation. According to the most standard definition in logic:
(Def∗)  ∈ I if and only if for all  ∈ L,  ` .
However, paraconsistent logicians choose a weaker definition:
(Def∗∗)  ∈ I if and only if there is  ∈ L such that  `  and  ` ¬.
Either definition can object to the other on the ground that it gives rise
to the wrong number of inconsistent sets - too many in the case of Def∗∗
and too few in the case of Def∗. Mathematicians have implicitly pushed
this debate aside by making the two definitions coincide; this is what (E6)
achieves here. By adopting this axiom, logical aggregation theory complies
with ordinary proof intuitions and only excludes a rather uncommon family
23For a similar view, see Makinson (2005, ch.1).
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of logical calculi.24
Under either definition, the axiomatization (E1)—(E6) implies the follow-
ing properties of I:
(I1) ∅ ∈ I (non-triviality).
(I2) For every  ∈ L, {¬} ∈ I (reflexivity).
(I3) For every  ⊂ L and every  ∈ L, if  ∈ I, either  ∪ {} ∈ I or
 ∪ {¬} ∈ I (single-step completion).
(I4) For every  ⊂ 0 ⊆ L, if  ∈ I then 0 ∈ I (monotonicity).
(I5) For every  ⊆ L, if  ∈ I, then there is a finite subset 0 ⊆  such
that 0 ∈ I (compactness).
(I1) and (I4) restate their inferential counterparts. (I2) can be expected to
hold when paraconsistency is put aside. (I3) permits completing a consistent
set by a formula or its negation, or equivalently, by a finite set of formulas
or their negations. In the presence of compactness - here (I5) - the step can
be made to the corresponding infinite property:
(I3+) For every  ⊂ L, if  ∈ I, there is  ⊂ L such that (i)  ⊆  ,
(ii)  ∈ I, and (iii), for every ¬ ∈ L, either  ∈  or ¬ ∈  (full
completion).
This is the so-called Lindenbaum extension property, which logicians usually
prove from other premisses. The set  introduced in section 3 is now put
on a firm logical basis: there exist consistent and complete judgment sets,
no matter the cardinality of the language.
The general logic can be presented in the opposite order, i.e., starting
from the set I axiomatized by (I1)—(I5), and treating the relation ` as
derived. It can then be checked that ` satisfies (E1)—(E6), which become
properties rather than axioms. A new connecting definition is needed if one
follows this reverse order of doing things:
(Def∗∗∗)  `  if and only if  ∪ {¬} ∈ I.
To reduce inference to inconsistency, as in (Def∗∗∗), is no less common than
to reduce inconsistency to inference, as in (Def∗), and the fact that our
general logic can rely on two axiomatizations instead of one makes it easier
to use in proving aggregation theorems. Since axioms and properties reflect
standard deductive practice, the proofs can be carried out at the intuitive
level as far the logic goes (the only exception being compactness, which we
argued must be mentioned).
Whichever of the two lists is taken as a criterion, classical propositional
calculi fall under the general logic. Non-classical propositional logics, on
the other hand, need to be examined one by one. Among them, there are
many deductive logics, as opposed to inductive or non-monotonic ones, that
fulfil the criterion, but some, especially with epistemic applications, turn
24See Priest (2002) for a survey of paraconsistent calculi and their motivations.
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out not to be compact.25 Any classical predicate calculus also obeys the
general logic. In this case, the formulas of L are the closed formulas of
the original language (i.e., those having no free variables in them) and the
combinations of them obtained with the Boolean connectives. It is then
routine to check that the inference relation of the calculus satisfies (E1)—
(E6) when it is restricted to L. There is another method to handle classical
predicate calculi, which dispenses with such a direct check. It consists in
extracting the propositional content from the predicate calculus by using a
standard isomorphism construction (see Barwise, 1977) and then invoking
the fact that classical propositional calculi agree with the general logic. Of
course non-classical predicate calculi call for the same kind of reservations
and checks as non-classical propositional calculi.
6 The canonical impossibility theorem
Section 5 has completed the unfinished work of section 3 in defining the
formal framework of logical aggregation theory. As it turns out, it is un-
necessary to fix a logical calculus in order to formalize judgments sets and
collective judgment functions. Any logical calculus has two components, i.e.,
a language or set of formulas L, and a logic as properly defined, which can
be described equally well in terms of an inference relation ` on L or a set
I of inconsistent subsets of L. Now, once L is fixed, logical aggregation
theorists may not elaborate on these items, simply requiring that they have
certain properties; the two salient ones are monotonicity and compactness.
In terms of `, monotonicity says that the premisses of an inference can be
increased without any conclusion being lost, and in terms of I, that the
supersets of an inconsistent set are inconsistent. In terms of `, compactness
says that any inference can be drawn from a finite number of premisses,
and in terms of I, that any inconsistency occurs among a finite number of
formulas. Because only such general conditions are needed for a proof in log-
ical aggregation theory, the theory can free itself from classical propositional
calculi. For given applications, it can envisage more expressive calculi, like
the predicate calculus and non-classical propositional calculi, and when no
specific application is intended, it can invoke general logic - the underlying
laws of ` or I - instead of any particular logical system.
Two derived logical notions enter the next theorem statements, and we
now introduce them formally. First, a set of formulas S ⊂ L is called
minimally inconsistent if it is inconsistent and all its proper subsets are
25Probabilistic epistemic logics are not compact (see Heifetz and Mongin, 2001), nor are
most logics of common knowledge (though some are, see Lismont and Mongin, 2002).
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consistent. For instance, this is the case for
{  ↔  ∧ ¬},
but not for
{¬¬ ↔  ∧  }.
Observe that compactness is required to ensure minimality when L and 
are infinite. Second, given  ∈ , we say that  is inferred conditionally
from  — denoted by  `∗  — if there is a set of auxiliary premisses  ⊂ 
such that (i)  ∪ {} `  and (ii)  ∪ {} and  ∪ {¬} are consistent.
( = ∅ is permitted.) Conditional inference can be reformulated in terms
of minimally inconsistent sets, and that is in eﬀect how it first arose in
the theory.26 Two further properties need mentioning: first, conditional
inference never relates a formula to its negation, and second, it satisfies
contraposition, i.e.,
 `∗  ⇔ ¬ `∗ ¬
Apart from not yet relying on general logic, Theorems 1-5 suﬀer from
being somewhat imprecise. As they are formulated, they only state suﬃcient
conditions on the agenda for there to exist no collective judgment functions
— except for degenerate ones — that satisfy specified axiomatic properties.
These hypotheses can be too strong for the conclusion, and if they are not,
an additional proof of necessity should establish this. Influenced first by
Nehring and Puppe (2002, 2010), and then by Dokow and Holzman (2009,
2010a and b), logical aggregation theory has taken on the task of character-
izing, in the sense of necessary and suﬃcient conditions, the agendas which
turn a list of axiomatic conditions into an impossibility. If the results of
these authors deserve being called canonical, it is not so much because of
their depth or generality, since they are far from unifying the whole theory,
but rather because they have established a format of results that is now
widely adopted. Here we follow Dokow and Holzman’s analysis, not repro-
ducing it as is, but rather rendering it into general logic; the diﬀerence with
the original formalism will be explained at the end of the section.
Dokow and Holzman raise and solve the following aggregative problem:
how to characterize the agendas  such that, if we define  with respect
to , there is no  :  →  that satisfies at once non-dictatorship,
independence, and unanimity preservation? The answer to this problem -
the mentioned canonical theorem - brings to the fore the following agenda
conditions:
(a) There exist a minimally inconsistent set of formulas  ⊆  and
distinct formulas  ∈  such that
26Under compactness,  `∗  is equivalent to requesting that  6= ¬ and there be
some minimally inconsistent  0 ⊂  with ¬ ∈  0.
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 0 =  \ {} ∪ {¬¬}
is consistent.
(b) For every formulas  ∈ , there exist formulas 1      ∈ 
such that
 = 1 `∗ 2 `∗    `∗  = .
If an agenda  satisfies (a), it is said to be even-number negatable. As a
notational shortcut, for any  ⊆  , we write ¬ for
 0 = ( \) ∪ {¬ :  ∈ } .27
If  satisfies (b), it is said to be path-connected (another received expression
is totally blocked).
Theorem 6 (Dokow and Holzman, 2010a; see also Nehring and
Puppe, 2002 and 2010, and for suﬃciency, Dietrich and List,
2007b). If  is even-number negatable and path-connected, there is no
 :  →  that satisfies non-dictatorship, unanimity preservation and
independence. When  ≥ 3, the agenda conditions are also necessary for
this conclusion.
To illustrate Theorem 1, we reexamine  :  → 2 when  is
odd and it is thus equivalent to say that  is not to  or to say that
there exists (1     ) making (1     ) inconsistent; denote this
property by (Inc). Given that  satisfies the three axioms, Theorem 6
gives the implication (a),(b) ⇒ (Inc). Let us illustrate this on the judiciary
agenda in discursive dilemma form:
 = {   ↔  ∧ }±.
We see that (a) holds by taking:
 = {¬  ↔  ∧ } and  = {¬ }, or
 = {  ¬(↔  ∧ )} and  = { },
or yet more choices, which suggests that (a) is easy to fulfil despite being
complex to specify. As for (b), Figure 1 shows that it is also satisfied. (In
this figure and the next,  stands for  ↔  ∧ , and the arrows indicate
conditional inferences, with the lower-case characters representing auxiliary
premisses for these inferences.)
27To satisfy (a), one can generally take any  ⊆  of even size and request that ¬ is
consistent (for this equivalence, see Dokow and Holzman, 2010a, and Dietrich and Mongin,
2010).
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between any pair of formulas.
The figure indicates sufficiently many conditional
entailments for being able to construct all existing
chains of conditional entailments by transitivity.
Figure 1: The agenda  satisfies (b).
Having exemplified (a) and (b) in their role as suﬃcient conditions for
the impossibility, we now illustrate why they are necessary by returning
to the argument made about the doctrinal paradox. An easy way to pay
attention to the legal theorists’ insights is to keep a classical propositional
formula for the legal doctrine and make it part of the inference relation
instead of the agenda. Compare with the critical points listed at the end of
section 2: this takes care not at all of (i), but fully of (ii), and it goes some
way towards accommodating (iii). Put otherwise, the court determines the
case from a common doctrine not putting it to vote, and using it rather like
a rule of decision. Let, then, a new inference relation `↔∧ be defined by:
 `↔∧ iﬀ  ∪ {↔  ∧ } ` ,
with a correspondingly reduced agenda:
 = {  }±.
Given the changes in conditional entailments,  satisfies (a) but not
(b); this is shown by Figure 2. Thus, for this agenda, Theorem 6 entails a
possibility result, i.e., there exists an  :  →  that is non-dictatorial,
unanimity preserving, and independent. An example is the function e
defined on  as follows: for every positive formula  ∈ , it respects
unanimity if either  or ¬ belongs to all individual judgment sets, and
in case of a split choice, it always chooses ¬. Compared with  in
section 3, e makes collective judgment sets complete while keeping them
consistent.28
The statement of Theorem 6 can be simplified when the focus of attention
shifts from general  to specific rules. Consider again  . We have already
28An inconsistent collective judgment set would have to include one of the following
minimally inconsistent subsets of : { ¬}, {¬ } or {¬ }. However, each case is
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Figure 2: The agenda  violates (b).
seen that (a), (b) ⇒ (Inc). It turns out that (Inc) ⇐⇒ (c), where this new
condition is:
(c) There exists a minimal inconsistent set of formulas  ⊆  such that
| | ≥ 3.
If  satisfies (c), it is said to be non-simple. To check that this is suﬃcient
for (Inc), construct a profile (1     ) such that  ⊂ (1     ).
To show that it is also necessary, apply the necessity part of Theorem 6 and
the fact that (b)⇒ (c), which is seen as follows. For any  ∈ , (b) entails
that there is a chain of conditional inferences:
 = 1 `∗ 2 `∗    `∗  = ¬.
In the absence of (c), this chain would reduce to:
 = 1 ` 2 `    `  = ¬,
which is impossible because logical inference is a transitive relation by the
general logic conditions.
Why has (a) disappeared and (b) been weakened so much when  =
? Heuristically, this must relate to properties of that rule that Theorem
6 does not mention, and two of them stand out, which are monotonicity
and systematicity. The following result, specifically part (iii), supports this
analysis.
Theorem 6’. (i) If  is even-number negatable and non-simple, there
is no  :  →  that satisfies non-dictatorship, unanimity preservation
and systematicity. When  ≥ 3, the conditions are also necessary for the
conclusion.
(ii) If  is path-connected, there is no  :  →  that satisfies non-
dictatorship, unanimity preservation and monotonic independence, and this
is also necessary for the conclusion.
(iii) If  is non-simple, there is no  :  →  that satisfies non-
dictatorship, unanimity preservation and monotonic systematicity. When
 ≥ 3, this is also necessary for the conclusion.
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Each of these statements has been proved separately, and in particular, (ii)
is the version of the canonical theorem established by Nehring and Puppe
(in 2010 for the logical aggregation framework, but as early as in 2002 in a
related framework of social choice). Today it is better to consider (i), (ii)
and (iii) as being partial results leading to Theorem 6. Comparing it with
Theorem 6’ permits locating what constraint on  is equivalent to a given
axiom placed on  , and in this way, the trade-oﬀ that is so typical of the
new theory comes out most rigourously. More can be said to illustrate this
trade-oﬀ.29
All of the preceding results allow for variants based on ∗ rather than.
In a nutshell, these turn  into an oligarchic rather than a dictatorial col-
lective judgment function, a somewhat less obvious form of degeneracy. By
definition,  is an oligarchy if there is a non-empty subset  ⊆ {1     }
such that, for all (1     ),




If  is an oligarchy,  is unique and will be called the set of oligarchs.
Dictatorship is the particular case where  is a singleton. (In section 4,
we encountered a stronger and less standard notion of oligarchy.) General
logic secures the fact that the intersection of consistent and deductively
closed sets retains these properties; as a result, if  is defined on  or
(∗) and it is an oligarchy, then its range is ∗. As nothing is specified to
settle disagreements between the oligarchs,  will often produce incomplete
collective judgment sets. This can be seen, e.g., from the unanimity rule
 , which corresponds to the maximal set of oligarchs.
Formally, non-dictatorship is replaced by:
Non-oligarchy.  is not an oligarchy,
and the following impossibility theorems ensue.
Theorems 7 and 7’. The statements are those of Theorems 6 and 6’,
with  :  →  being replaced by  :  → ∗ or  : (∗) → ∗, and
non-dictatorship being replaced by non-oligarchy.
29Here are two more variants. Dietrich and List (2010b) weaken systematicity in state-
ment (i) by requiring it only for pairs ¬ ∈  instead of, generally, pairs  ∈ .
At the same time, they strengthen the agenda conditions of (i) by adding that  should
be non-separable in some appropriate (and mild) sense. In their social-choice theoretic
framework, Nehring and Puppe (2005) essentially prove a variant of (iii) relying on the
same trade-oﬀ between weakening systematicity and adding non-separability.
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These various extensions can be found in Dietrich and List (2008a) and
Dokow and Holzman (2010b).30 Like the initial results, they have counter-
parts in social choice theory, and we now turn to these comparisons. Put
briefly, each logical aggregation theorem induces a social choice theorem via
a suitably selected logical calculus. It will typically be a fragmentary classical
predicate calculus, whose language has one or more binary relation symbols
to represent preferences. Axioms formulated in this language will capture
the properties of preferences that one is willing to assume, such as transi-
tivity and the like. The inference relation of the chosen predicate calculus
will have to be augmented with those preference axioms, in exactly the same
way as the inference relation of the judiciary example was made to include
the legal doctrine formula. That is the method followed by Dietrich and
List (2007b) to derive from (the suﬃciency part of) Theorem 6 a partial
version of Arrow’s theorem, in which there occur only strict preferences on
both the individual and collective sides. They introduce a classical predi-
cate calculus, whose language LÂ is built from basic formulas  Â  (" is
strictly preferred to ") and whose inference relation `Â incorporates the
three properties of asymmetry, transitivity and completeness. As an agenda
Â ⊂ LÂ, they simply take the set of basic formulas. The proof consists
in showing, first, that conditions (a) and (b) hold of Â , and second, that
Arrow’s "social welfare function", with its relevant set of axioms, can be
associated with a collective judgment function  meeting the conditions of
Theorem 6.31
With somewhat diﬀerent techniques, Theorem 7 was also put to work on
preference relations. Dokow and Holzman (2010b) show that it entails novel
versions of Gibbard’s (1969) theorem on oligarchies, and by a detour, that
very theorem itself. Unlike the application just covered, this one involves
weak preference relations, i.e., allows for the possibility of indiﬀerence. Re-
call that Gibbard proved that if the collective preference relation is required
to satisfy quasi-transitivity, i.e., the transitivity of its strict preference part,
regardless of the other forms of transitivity, then Arrow’s conditions entail
that there is an oligarchy rather a dictator. Here, an oligarchy is defined
as any group of individuals which, for any preference profile, imposes strict
preferences that are unanimously agreed in the group, and vetoes strict pref-
erences that contradict the strict preferences of any member of the group.32
As a somewhat unexpected by-product, Dokow and Holzman obtain Ar-
30The early oligarchic result of Gärdenfors (2006) imposes unnecessarily strong condi-
tions on the agenda for impossibility.
31 In their introductory article, List and Polak (2010) stepwise reformulate the standard
proof of Arrow’s theorem in order to get one for Theorem 6. This is another way of
connecting the two results.
32 In the above notation,  Â  holds if this is agreed, and  º  (" is strictly preferred or
indiﬀerent with ") holds if at least one member agrees with  Â . Gibbard’s unpublished
theorem has gained fame owing to Sen (1970, ch.4, and 1986).
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row’s theorem in its integrity, that is for weak preferences, thus completing
Dietrich and List’s programme.33
If one adds another example from Dietrich and List (2008b), which con-
cerns Sen’s (1970) liberal paradox, and the already discussed work on voting
rules, one has virtually exhausted the current stock of applications to so-
cial choice theory. Note that they all involve abstract domains of alternatives
and preferences rather than specialized "economic" or "political" domains.34
Clearly the more concrete the domain, the more problematic it is to describe
by means of a logical language, and this sets a limit to the applications that
can be hoped for. Still, within the scope of the theory, the technique that
consists in specializing L to a preference language is both easy and promis-
ing, and much remains to be done along this line.
We have stated the results of this section in terms of the general logic,
which gives them wide applicability, but this presentation does not accu-
rately reflect the historical process of discovery, which went through various
technical hypotheses, each of them more restrictive than ours. Dokow and
Holzman, for their part, use a formalism called abstract aggregation, which
goes back to Fishburn and Rubinstein (1986), Wilson (1975) and Guilbaud
(1952). Starting from a finite number  of propositions that correspond to
the positive formulas of our agendas, they render the individual and col-
lective judgments concerning these propositions by the values 0 or 1 that
the individuals or the collectivity attribute to them. Thus, after fixing an
arbitrary order on propositions, they can reduce the aggregative problem to
the study of subsets of {0 1} and of functions defined from these subsets. If
E ⊂ {0 1} represents the set of admissible judgment sets, then  : E → E
represents a collective judgment function, the analogue of our  :  → .
All conditions imposed on  can be redefined to bear on .
Such a terse statement of the aggregative problem yields quick and el-
egant proofs, as Guilbaud had already foreshadowed, but it tends to erase
the logical and linguistic properties of judgments, along with certain con-
ceptual distinctions that flow from these properties. The stage of defining
the agenda is absorbed into the - one would expect, later - stage of defin-
ing what judgment sets are allowed. Sometimes, the same E corresponds to
diﬀerent agendas. For example, with  = 2, take the set
E = {(1 1) (0 1) (0 0)}.
33Dietrich (2007b) has an alternative derivation in a rich framework of logical aggrega-
tion, where he assumes that formulas have relevance relations in addition to their logical
relations. In still a diﬀerent framework, Nehring (2003) derives a version of Arrow’s theo-
rem for weak preferences that involves a monotonic addition to independence of irrelevant
alternatives.
34Such as those described by Gaertner (2006) and Le Breton and Weymark (2011).
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In classical propositional logic, there are at least two agendas that could
give rise to this, i.e.,
 = {  ∨ }± and  0 = { ∧  → }±,
and it would be a conceptual abuse to treat them as they were the same.
(This example comes from List and Puppe, 2009.) Another relevant distinc-
tion, that between  and ∗, cannot be stated in the abstract aggregation
framework as naturally as it is in the logical framework. As a secondary
technical issue, the initial assumption of a finite number  of propositions is
too sweeping. Thanks to the flexible use of compactness, the general logic
here has an advantage, its cost being a certain unwieldiness.35
The set-theoretic framework just discussed should not be confused with
those formalisms which diﬀer from ours, much less drastically, by replacing
the syntactical account of the logic (in terms of inference or inconsistent sets)
by a semantic account (in terms of valuations or related model-theoretic
ideas). For example, Pauly and van Hees (2006) describe individual and
collective judgments in terms of Boolean valuations, rather than complete
and consistent sets of Boolean formulas, but this is just an expository choice,
and we have unproblematically translated their work into the present frame-
work.36
This section brings the theoretical development of the discursive dilemma
to a close. The initial insights were, in section 3, that it was rather a
trilemma, and in section 4, that the omitted branch was independence, not
systematicity. As it now appears from the canonical theorem and its vari-
ants, it is really a tetralemma, with the definition of the agenda as the fourth
branch, because it can be also resolved by dropping either condition (a) or
(b). It now remains to be seen if the doctrinal paradox can be submitted to
a such a thorough analysis.
7 Back to the doctrinal paradox
Briefly put, the doctrinal paradox diﬀers from the discursive dilemma by
separating premisses and conclusions, and in its judicial application, by tak-
ing legal doctrine to be central and specific. We will reexamine both aspects
in turn and show that logical aggregation theory can be revised so as to pay
35For more technical comparisons between the two frameworks, see Dokow and Holzman
(2009).
36There are many other ways in which the theory lends itself to the logician’s work. Here
are two recent examples. Pauly (2007 and 2009) reformulates the acceptance of formulas
in terms of a modal operator, rather than by set-theoretic membership, as is done here.
Cariani, Pauly and Snyder (2008) define on collective judgment functions a condition of
language invariance that leads to a new impossibility result.
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attention to them. In this way, the doctrinal paradox will receive a theoret-
ical treatment of its own, while the gap with the discursive dilemma will to
some extent be filled.
In the framework adopted here, the distinction between premisses and
conclusions can only be made clear if at least one axiom applies diﬀerently
to the corresponding sets of formulas. For this axiom, the canonical theorem
leaves the choice between independence and unanimity preservation, since
non-dictatorship is used only to state impossibility. Let us represent the
premisses and conclusions by two subsets  and  of the agenda . We
will discriminate between  and  in terms of independence, reserving it
to  , while keeping unanimity preservation applied to the whole of . In
the judiciary example, the decisions about the issues are taken following a
majority vote on each of them, and by imposing both independence and
unanimity preservation on  , we merely generalize this fact abstractly. By
contrast, according to the legal theorists, a decision on the case can be
taken diﬀerently from by a formal vote, be it simple majority or otherwise.
Respecting consensus seems to be the only norm that the procedure must
then guarantee, and this is what our single condition placed on  conveys.
Also, Kornhauser and Sager, as opposed to List and Pettit, do not always
want to subject the legal doctrine to a formal vote by the judges. In their
view, agreement may result on it as informally as it does on the case. Then,
unanimity preservation strikes one again as being the suitable condition - no
less than this, because it is a bare normative minimum, and no more either,
because the informal procedure is left unspecificied. Thus, if it makes sense
to locate the legal doctrine in  rather than  , our assumptions will capture
another significant legal insight.
Theorem 8 below shows that, under agenda conditions close to those
of the canonical theorem, the set of axioms just discussed forces  to be
a dictatorship, and Theorem 9 delivers the corresponding oligarchic result.
Further results that we do not state here reproduce the two impossibility
conclusions when independence gives way to systematicity, monotonic inde-
pendence, or monotonic systematicity. This analysis, due to Dietrich and
Mongin (2010), actually includes the canonical theorem and its variants, be-
cause the chosen axiomatization is weaker - independence or its reinforced
versions being only applied to  ⊆  - and because the agenda conditions
turn out to be the canonical ones in the special case  = .
Formally, we define  = {    }± as any non-empty set of  that is
closed by negation, and put  =  \  . The new axioms on  restate
existing ones in terms of this partition.
Systematicity (resp. Independence) on premisses  : now only
for each pair of formulas   ∈  (resp. every formula  ∈  ).
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Unanimity preservation on premisses  (resp. conclusions ):
now only for every formula  ∈  (resp. every formula  ∈ ).
Non-dictatorship on premisses  : there is no  = 1      such that
 (1     ) ∩  =  ∩  for every (1     ) ∈ .
Non-oligarchy on premisses  : there is no nonempty subset  ⊆
{1     } such that  (1     )∩ = (T∈ )∩ for every (1     ) ∈.
The new agenda conditions also take the partition of  and  into
account.
(a ) There exist a minimally inconsistent set of formulas  ⊂  and
distinct premiss formulas   ∈  ∩  such that ¬{} is consistent.
(b ) For every premiss formulas   ∈  , there exist premiss formulas
1      ∈  such that
 = 1 `∗ 2 `∗    `∗  = .
(Remember that  `∗  means  ∪ {} `  for some  ⊂ ; thus, the
formulas of  can be logically related by means of those of .)
(c ) There exists a minimally inconsistent subset of formulas  ⊂ 
such that | ∩  | ≥ 3.
Let us say that  is even-number negatable (resp. path-connected, non-
simple) in the premisses  if (a ) (resp. (b ), (c )) holds.
Theorem 8. If  is both even-negatable and path-connected in the
premisses  , there is no  :  →  that satisfies:
• on premisses  , non-dictatorship, independence and unanimity preser-
vation,
• on conclusions , unanimity preservation.
When  ≥ 3, the agenda conditions are necessary for this conclusion.
Theorem 9. The statement is the same with  :  → ∗ instead of
 :  → , and non-oligarchy on premisses  instead of non-dictatorship
on premisses  .
As pointed out, Theorems 6 and 7 follow from setting  =  in Theo-
rems 8 and 9, and Theorems 6’ and 7’ are similarily recovered (see Dietrich
and Mongin, 2010, for details). The agenda characterization for  is also
included; for it (b )⇒(c ) holds, and (c ) is necessary and suﬃcient for
(1     ) ∩  to be inconsistent for some profile (1     ).
On the conceptual level, the analysis puts the doctrinal paradox to the
test, and it escapes consolidated. There is no need for majority voting in
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order for the premiss-based and the conclusion-based methods to conflict:
it is enough to state some of the broad conditions that they satisfy. This
parallels the statement already made on the discursive dilemma in sections
3 and 4, but here is a more specific comment. Many writers - among them
Pettit (2001) and a majority of legal theorists37 - have expressed a considered
preference for the premiss-based over the conclusion-based method. In their
view, the objection that the former is not fully responsive to the individuals
carries less weight than the objection that the latter is open to collective irra-
tionality. These were the opposite considerations adduced in section 2. What
Theorems 8 and 9 add to this discussion is that the premiss-based method
cannot be made more responsive to individuals, since it collapses into impos-
sibilities with a modicum of extra-responsiveness (unanimity preservation on
conclusions); so its democratic weakness appears to be irreparable.
Thus far, in order to keep the analysis more general, we have made
no restriction on what distinguishes a premiss from a conclusion. Now,
to recover ordinary notions, it is enough to assume that formulas in  bear
relevant logical connections with those in  . The following agenda condition
does the job: it requires that complete and consistent judgments sets be
axiomatized by the premisses they contain.
(d ) For every  ∈ ,
 = { ∈  |  ∩  ` }.
Let us say that  is logicaly split by premisses  if (d ) holds. Adding this
agenda conditions to the others strengthens the impossibilities, for instance
turning dictatorship on  into dictatorship (i.e., on the whole of ).
Corollary to Theorem 8. If  is logically split by premisses  , and
 is both even-negatable and path-connected in  , there is no  :  → 
that satisfies non-dictatorship, and
• for  , independence and unanimity preservation,
• for , unanimity preservation.
When  ≥ 3, the agenda conditions are necessary for this conclusion.
From this Corollary, Theorem 4 follows if one specializes the general logic
into a classical propositional calculus. In this case, the choice of  = 
automatically satisfies (d ). Section 4 had not fully stated the conditions
that Theorem 4 placed on ; the missing ones are actually (a ) and (b ).
37See the review of legal theorists in Nash (2003). For their part, Kornhauser and Sager
choose diﬀerently according to the circumstances. They also recommend that the court
take a "meta-vote" on the procedure first.
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No conditional entailment goes





Figure 3: The agenda  with  = { }± violates (b )
This ex post derivation establishes the generality of the analysis in another
way.
The agenda conditions (a ), (b ), (c ), (d ) can be illustrated by new
variants of the judiciary example, and this discussion is also useful in clar-
ifying models of the legal doctrine. To begin with, take the agenda ,
which contains the Boolean formula  =  ↔  ∧ . On the one hand, if
 = { }±, then (b ) is violated, and the court’s decision escapes from the
impossibility, contrary to what the canonical theorem would predict here.
This is illustrated in Figure 3. The choice of  amounts to making the legal
doctrine part of the conclusions, which is permissible since (d ) does not
hold and the partition between  and  can be interpreted procedurally
(the doctrine is not submitted to a vote or any formal procedure). Note
that (c ) is also violated, hence  no longer has any drawback (at least
if  is odd). On the other hand, if  = {  }±, then (b ) is satisfied. This
is illustrated by Figure 4. Also, (a ) is satisfied; so, the court’s decision falls
back into the impossibility predicted by the canonical theorem. Unlike the
previous one, this choice  satisfies (d ) and thus turns the partition with
 into an intuitive division of premisses and conclusions.
Now, take  = {  }±, i.e., the agenda that is associated with the
modified inference relation ` of last section. With  = { }±, a natural
choice, (b ) is violated, as Figure 5 shows. Even (c ) is violated, which
makes  unobjectionable. Also, (d ) is satisfied, which makes the par-
tition interpretable in terms of premisses and conclusions as normally un-
derstood. This case captures the popular solution to the doctrinal paradox
that consists in applying the premiss-based method alone.
The agendas just discussed illustrate Theorem 8 while having some le-
gal relevance, but it is doubtful that any of them represents legal doctrine
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A chain of conditional entailments
between any pair of formulas.
The figure indicates sufficiently many conditional
entailments for being able to construct all existing
chains of conditional entailments by transitivity.




No conditional entailment goes
to any of the premisses v and b.
Figure 5: The agenda  with  = { }± violates (b ).
appropriately. At the end of section 2, we asked - see question (i) - whether
it could be rendered by classical logic. We now argue that the Boolean bi-
conditional ↔ in the formula  =  ↔  ∧  has undesirable eﬀects that
can be avoided by the non-Boolean operator ←→ of conditional logic. The
argument parallels that which Dietrich (2010) uses more generally in favour
of such logics.38
To see what goes wrong with agenda , let us pick up those minimal
inconsistent subsets which contain :
1 = {¬  }, 2 = {¬  },
3 = { ¬ }, 4 = {¬},
5 = {  ¬}, 6 = {¬¬¬},
7 = {¬¬¬}.
That 5, 6, 7 are inconsistent is somewhat counterintuitive given the legal
context. In each of these sets, judges deny that  is equivalent to  and ,
38As is well-known, the calculi of conditional logic overcome the paradoxes of "material"
(Boolean) implication, another example of which is given in the next paragraph. We may
only refer to the classic work by Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973). For a review, see
Edgington (2008) or Nuete and Cross (2001).
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and this allegedly clashes with certain positions they take on ,  or . It
seems that they may consistently deny the equivalence and accept these
positions. Specifically, suppose that they have in mind another issue  that
is not mentioned here and hold that  is equivalent to ∧ ∧ . In this case,
they may deny that  is equivalent to  ∧  and nonetheless:
• accept , ,  and  (contrast with the alleged inconstency of 5);
• reject  and  regardless of how they judge  and  (contrast with the
alleged inconsistency of 6);
• reject  and  regardless of how they judge  and  (contrast with the
alleged inconsistency of 7).
To put it otherwise, the following theorem of classical propositional logic:
(∗) ¬(↔  ∧ ) a` ¬↔  ∧ 
contradicts normal intuitions of legal deliberation. Now, returning to the
table, we see there is nothing intuitively wrong with the sets 1 to 4, or
with the corresponding theorems:
(∗∗) ↔  ∧    ` 
↔  ∧   ` 
↔  ∧   ` .
One would indeed expect that accepting the doctrine, as opposed to refusing
it, entail the consequences claimed formally by classical propositional logic.
The calculi of conditional logic axiomatize the conditional, →, and so the
biconditional,←→, in a way that exactly fits these divided intuitions. They
give rise to a list of minimally inconsistent subsets that is reduced to 1—4,
or equivalently, only retain (∗∗) excluding (∗). It is not necessary to decide
between the various diﬀerent systems, since all satisfy the general logic and
any of them can do for the purpose. We would have then to replace  with
 0 = {   0}, where 0 =  ←→  ∧ . Remarkably, when Theorem 6
is applied to this agenda, it is seen to be even-number negatable, but not
path-connected, so that the negative conclusion obtained for  no longer
holds; see Figure 6 and compare it with Figure 1. Similarly with Theorem
8,  0 is not path-connected in premisses for any of the choices for  that we
have envisaged. Thus, the negative conclusion is again beaten back.
Now, what about the agenda  = {  }± when the equivalence for-
mula placed in the inference rule is non-classical? The rule defined by
 `0  iﬀ  ∪ {0} ` ,
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No conditional entailment goes from
any negative to any positive premisse.
The figure indicates sufficiently many conditional
entailments for being able to construct all existing
chains of conditional entailments by transitivity.
Figure 6: The agenda  0 violates (b).
leads to the same violations of path-connectedness as ` did above. Indeed,
only accepting the doctrine is a possibility, and as transpires from what has
been said, classical and non-classical equivalences collapse onto each other
in this case.
To summarize the main results of this section, when legal doctrine is
internal to the agenda (case  0 versus ), departing from classical logic
gives way to additional possibilities, but nothing is gained when legal doc-
trine is external (case  with either ` or `0). Is there some reason to
decide between internal and external representations, as there is one to de-
cide between classical and non-classical calculi? We do not think so. The
discursive dilemma automatically imposes the internal representation, and
section 2 questioned this choice, but this was not to say that the opposite
one was compelling. Actually, each may be justified according to the cir-
cumstances: legal theory only suggests that judges do not normally vote on
the doctrine, not that they never do so. In sum, the usually best model is
given by  = {  }± with the rule `0 (here equivalent to `), but  0
will nonetheless be sometimes appropriate. The only agenda we exclude is
, that of the discursive dilemma, which signals where our analysis departs
from the more familiar one.
8 Conclusion and some open questions
Throughout this account of logical aggregation theory, our guiding heuristic
was that the doctrinal had been underrated, compared with its discursive
dilemma variant, and that it called for its own analytical treatment. We have
shown how the current work, as epitomized by the canonical theorem, could
be revised so as to take notice of the paradox and deepen its explanation.
This move illustrates the flexibility and expressive power of the framework
collectively put in place in the 2000s. Notice however that using logic is
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essential to the changes we suggest, and not all current contributors approve
of the logical turn taken by judgment aggregation theory.
By and large, the doctrinal paradox appears to be less of a problem for
collective judgment than does the discursive dilemma. The simplest reason is
that the premiss-based approach, which is not even definable in the context
of the latter problem, oﬀers a satisfactory way out in many occurrences
of the former. As the last section showed, the impossibility part of our
theorem applies to the judiciary example only for a dubious logical rendering
of the logical doctrine. However, this unfavourable case is a warning that the
premiss-based method is not immune to impossibilities, contrary to what is
generally believed. Legal theorists and political philosophers still have to
take this finding into account.
Returning to the more standard work, we should emphasize that it has
not yet reached its final stage. To begin with, the canonical theorem has fixed
a format of results that is not yet applied everywhere. In particular, the early
theorems should be revisited. They provide only suﬃcient agenda conditions
for the impossibilities they state, and because they derive them without the
help of unanimity preservation, they are covered neither by the canonical
theorem nor by our generalization. In bringing them to the format, one may
hope to clarify two theoretical issues, i.e., what agenda conditions are both
necessary and suﬃcient for independence to entail unanimity preservation,
and what impossibilities, if any, surround independence when this entailment
does not hold.
In social choice theory, independence of irrelevant alternatives and the
Pareto conditions are logically independent conditions, and an impossibil-
ity has famously been derived by Wilson (1972) from the former condition
alone. Thus, by answering the previous group of questions, one would further
tighten the connection with the antecedent theory. As the existing deriva-
tions of Arrow’s, Gibbard’s and Sen’s theorems indicate, it is natural to work
from logical aggregation theory to social choice theory, and much remains
to be done in this way despite the limitations imposed by logical languages.
However, one may wonder whether the other direction is feasible. Could
a suitably doctored variant of Arrow’s impossibility theorem entail a corre-
sponding result in logical aggregation theory? Many believe that this reverse
programme is a non-starter, but few have actually tried their hands at it.
A no doubt more pressing task would be to complement today’s negative
conclusions by a richer array of positive solutions. It would be nonsense to
complain that the theory is exclusively negative, since every theorem stated
in the canonical format can be read in the positive way, as we illustrated
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at length with judiciary examples. However, after so much emphasis laid
on agenda conditions, more work should be done on the axioms put on the
collective judgment function. Computer scientists have opened an interest-
ing avenue when defining merging rules on belief sets, and several writers -
starting with Pigozzi (2002) - have recommended that logical aggregation
theory borrow from this technology. A belief set is essentially the same as
a judgment set in the syntactical formulation developed here, and an im-
portant class of merging rules, i.e., the distance-based ones, are especially
easy to accommodate by this formulation. They amount to minimizing the
distance from the collective set to the given profile, where the notion of dis-
tance between two sets can be defined variously from the logical language;
see Konieczny and Pino-Perez (2002) for basic principles and Miller and Os-
herson (2008), as well as Lang, Pigozzi, Slavkovik, and van der Torre (2011),
for relevant elaborations.
In these schemes, the impossibility of logical aggregation is circumvented
by giving up independence, and there are normative arguments to support
this line. One of them is that formula-wise aggregation leaves no room for
taking into account the reasons that individuals have to accept or reject a
proposition (Mongin, 2008). This should be balanced against the technical
advantage that independence prevents strategic manipulations of agendas
(Dietrich, 2006). Social choice theorists have also debated independence of
irrelevant alternatives, but the two discussions are not parallel, and this can
be explained by their diﬀerent objects.39 To relax unanimity preservation
would lead to diﬀerent possibilities, but regrettably, these have been hardly
discussed thus far. There is also a normative argument to support this line,
as was mentioned earlier.
The most drastic resolution of all is to move from the logical to the
probabilistic framework, as many economists brought up in the Bayesian
tradition would no doubt recommend. This move is somehow comparable
with the change undergone by social choice theory when the "social welfare
functional", defined on profiles of individual utility functions, replaced the
"social welfare function" defined on profiles of individual preference rela-
tions.40 Inspection of the existing results for this richer framework shows
that the same selection of axioms, mutatis mutandis, leads to non-trivial
combinations of probability measures instead of dictatorships or oligarchies.
However, these positive solutions degenerate for suitable strengthenings of
the axioms, and the richer framework needs justifying anyhow. In social
39The received argument against independence of irrelevant alternatives is that it pre-
vents taking into account preference intensities, and the received argument for it that it
blocks the individuals’ strategic misreporting of their preferences. For a critical reexami-
nation, see Lehtinen (2011).
40See d’Aspremont (1985), Sen (1986), and specifically, d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002).
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choice theory, the observer or planner may be unable to define the "in-
formational basis" that would allow him to make trade-oﬀs between the
individuals’ conflicting interests, and by the same token, the group’s rep-
resentative may be unable to quote the numerical degrees of certainty that
would allow him to balance the individuals’ conflicting opinions against each
other.
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